Under Siege: Freedom of Choice and the Statutory
Ban on Abortions on Military Bases
Amy E. Crawfordt

Under current federal law, a woman may not obtain an abortion
on a military base even when she is willing to pay for it.' Exceptions
are made for situations in which the woman's life is endangered or the
pregnancy results from rape or incest. Servicewomen or female dependents of servicepersons stationed in foreign countries must leave
the American base in order to obtain either nontherapeutic abortions
or even medically necessary abortions in which the woman's life is not
endangered
Although a number of commentators and legislators have argued

that the military abortion ban is bad policy and abridges the constitutional rights of servicewomen or dependents, few, if any, have ex" B.A. 1998, University of Notre Dame; J.D. 2004, The University of Chicago.
I See 10 USC § 1093(b) (2000). The statute provides, in pertinent part:
Restriction on Use of Facilities. - No medical treatment facility or other facility of the Department of Defense may be used to perform an abortion except where the life of the
mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term or in a case in which the
pregnancy is the result of an act of rape or incest.
2
A nontherapeutic, or "voluntary," abortion is one that is not procured for reasons concerning the health or safety of the mother.
3
Of course, in some cases, it may be difficult to know when a medically necessary abortion crosses the threshold of "life endangering." See, for example, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, S 1050, 108th Cong, 1st Sess (May 13, 2003), in 149 Cong Rec
S 6892, 6910-11 (May 22, 2003) (statement of Senator Feinstein). Senator Feinstein discussed a
letter she had received from Holly Webb, the wife of an Air Force staff sergeant stationed at Misawa, Japan. Webb had detailed in her letter the refusal of military doctors to perform an abortion after her water broke at twenty weeks. Though the doctors had told her that she faced a risk
of infection and that her baby would suffer serious health complications if it were able to survive,
they refused to dilate her cervix or induce labor because such procedures would be considered
an abortion. When she went to a private Japanese hospital off base, doctors there told her that
she "would very likely die" if she did not immediately take intravenous antibiotics. The Japanese
doctors dilated her cervix and she delivered a stillborn baby. The military hospital later told her
that this was an elected abortion and not a stillborn birth. See id.
4
See David L. Englin, Surrendering Rights, New Republic Online (Sept 12, 2002), online
at http://www.tnr.com/doc.mhtml?i=express&s=englin09l2O2 (visited May 16,2004):
In today's military ... birth control of every kind is freely and easily available for men,
women, and even for minors; obstetric, gynecological, and pediatric care are available and
encouraged; and even vasectomies are free and commonplace. Nobody contemplating the
rights they might forgo in the service of their country could reasonably look at the reality of
the military health care system and believe they will be expected to sacrifice their constitutional rights to reproductive choice. And certainly nobody would reasonably expect wives,
daughters, and other civilians to sacrifice their rights.
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plored whether the ban is actually constitutional. The ban implicates

two seemingly conflicting lines of Supreme Court jurisprudence: that
of abortion on the one hand and deference to the military on the
other. The Supreme Court's abortion doctrine confirms that women
have a constitutional right to an abortion However, the government
is not constitutionally required to guarantee access to an abortion.
Abortion laws are subject to the "undue burden" standard; that is, if a
regulation imposes an undue burden on a woman's right to an abortion, it is unconstitutional.! The military deference doctrine complicates the constitutional analysis of the military abortion ban because
constitutional rights may be less stringently examined in "recognition
that within the military individual rights must of necessity be curtailed
lest the military's mission be impaired."8 When assessing the constitutionality of military regulations, courts typically apply an extremely
deferential form of "rational basis" review.' Under this standard, a
military regulation need only be rationally related to a legitimate mili-

tary interest in order to be constitutional, even if that regulation infringes on constitutional rights.

See also National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, S 2514, 107th Cong, 2d Sess
(May 15,2002), in 148 Cong Rec S 5825,5826 (June 20,2002) (statement of Senator Murray):
Surprisingly, as the women of our military fight for our freedoms overseas, they are actually
denied some of those freedoms during their service. Here at home, women have the right to
choose. They have constitutionally protected access to safe and legal reproductive health
services. But that is not the case for military women serving overseas.
5 See Roe v Wade, 410 US 113,163-64 (1973) (concluding that a state may not regulate the
performance of abortions prior to viability); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvaniav
Casey, 505 US 833,846 (1992) (reaffirming the central holding of Roe v Wade that a woman has a
right to choose abortion before viability).
6
See Harrisv McRae, 448 US 297, 300-01, 326-27 (1980) (upholding the Hyde Amendment's prohibition on the use of Medicaid funds for abortions except when the mother is the victim of rape or incest or her life is endangered); Maher v Roe, 432 US 464,473-74 (1977) (upholding a regulation limiting state Medicaid benefits to those abortions that are medically necessary).
7
Casey, 505 US at 874 (plurality) ("Only where state regulation imposes an undue burden
on a woman's ability to make this decision does the power of the State reach into the heart of
the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.").
8 Able v United States, 155 F3d 628,633-34 (2d Cir 1998) (upholding homosexual conduct
as grounds for military discharge).
9 Courts do not always apply rational basis review to the military. For example, in the
equal protection context, courts tend to apply heightened scrutiny according to the same framework that exists in cases not involving the military. See, for example, Frontiero v Richardson,411
US 677,690-91 (1973) (plurality) (holding that the statutory difference in the treatment of male
and female military personnel for the purpose of determining "dependent" benefits violated the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment). The plurality opinion in Frontiero was one of the
first opinions to adopt heightened scrutiny for sex-based classifications. See also Berkley v
United States, 287 F3d 1076, 1091 (Fed Cir 2002) (reversing the trial court on the ground that
strict scrutiny, not rational basis, was the appropriate standard to be applied to an Air Force policy that treated women and minority officers differently from other officers with regard to involuntary termination).
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In this Comment, I attempt to reconcile the abortion and military

doctrines in the context of the military ban on privately funded abortions. I maintain that, because both the undue burden standard and rational basis review forbid government regulation based on an illegitimate purpose, the military abortion ban is unconstitutional under either standard. First, abortion jurisprudence suggests that restrictions
fashioned with the purpose of placing obstacles before a woman's
right to choose impose burdens that are per se undue. I argue that the
ban has the impermissible purpose and effect of placing obstacles in

the path of a woman seeking an abortion; thus, the burden imposed is
per se undue.
Second, the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments demand that a legislative classification be rationally re-

lated to a legitimate government purpose.' ° Thus, rational basis review
simply verifies that a regulation offers rational means to achieve legitimate ends. In the case of the military abortion ban, the military
context is the only reason to deviate from the undue burden standard
that would normally apply. Therefore, the ban must be rationally related to a legitimate military purpose in order to trigger (and withstand) the more deferential standard of review. However, the ban
lacks a genuine military justification; thus, it fails rational basis review.
This argument is difficult because courts conducting rational basis review rarely look beyond a government's asserted justification to determine whether it is pretextual." However, a court will cast a skeptical eye toward justifications that it perceives as pretextual. This skepticism will inform both the choice of a standard of review (which is
why a court would likely use the undue burden standard) and a decision on the merits (which is why a court would strike down the ban
under either standard).
I argue that an outright ban on abortions on military bases is unconstitutional as applied to women on foreign bases with hospital facilities that routinely perform operations of similar complexity.'2
10 See, for example, United States Departmentof Agriculture v Moreno, 413 US 528, 532-33
(1973) (holding that a provision denying food stamps to all unrelated individuals living in a
household violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, because the provision did
not rationally further any legitimate government interests).
1 See, for example, Williamson v Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc,348 US 483,487-88 (1955)
("It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the
particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it.").
12 Challenges to the constitutionality of statutes and regulations are generally
brought as
"facial" challenges or as "as-applied" challenges If a court holds that a statute is unconstitutional
as applied to a particular case, the statute may be enforced in different circumstances. See Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 Stan L Rev 235, 236 (1994).
Normally, a facial challenge "must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the
Act would be valid." United States v Salerno, 481 US 739,745 (1987). However, the Casey plurality "explained that a statute imposes an 'undue burden' if it operates as a substantial obstacle to
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Moreover, both the undue burden and rational basis standards leave
ample leeway for discretionary denials of abortions on foreign bases
for any number of reasons. Where real military necessity imposes constraints on the hospital facilities available or the type of medical services offered, a woman may be refused an abortion at her particular
location without offending the Constitution. Though I discuss some of
the factors that might be relevant to individual determinations, it is
beyond the scope of this Comment to analyze the precise conditions
under which an abortion may or may not be prohibited. Instead, I focus on the more interesting doctrinal questions posed by the collision
of these two distinct contexts. But at bottom, this Comment is not advocating a constitutional right to an abortion in the foxhole; it merely
suggests that, where facilities are available, servicewomen and female
dependents on foreign bases have the same constitutional right to access self-financed abortions as their stateside counterparts.
Part I of this Comment discusses the history and possible rationales for the ban. Part II explores the background law on abortion and
on the deference given to decisions made by Congress on behalf of
the military. Part III argues that the ban fails the undue burden standard because it has the purpose and effect of blocking access to abortion, and that it fails rational basis review because it is not rationally
related to legitimate military goals (and may even work against such
goals). I conclude that, while national security demands deferential
review for those regulations that promote the effectiveness of the
military, courts should take a skeptical view of legislation that hinders
both private rights and military efficiency in favor of achieving unrelated political goals.
I. THE BAN ON PRIVATELY FUNDED ABORTIONS
ON MILITARY BASES

An examination of the history of the military abortion ban indicates that it may have been instituted (and opposed) primarily for political, rather than military, reasons. It is difficult to justify the ban
based on concerns about federal funding for abortions, because it proa woman's choice to have an abortion in a 'large fraction' of the cases in which the statute is
relevant." Rachel D. King, Comment, A Back Door Solution: Stenberg v. Carhart and the Answer
to the Casey/Salerno Dilemma for FacialChallenges to Abortion Statutes, 50 Emory L J 873, 88283 (2001). Almost all Supreme Court cases involving abortion restrictions have involved facial
challenges, often brought by abortion providers. This is in large part because there is little incentive for a pregnant woman to mount a challenge to an abortion restriction because her case will
probably not be resolved during the period in which she can procure an abortion. However, in
the military context, it is not clear who, other than a pregnant woman, would have standing to
sue. Moreover, a challenge is unlikely to be undertaken by a servicewoman; the military tends to
be a close-knit, conservative community marked by strict adherence to the chain of command,
and the reputational consequences of an abortion challenge may make such an action unlikely.
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hibits even those abortions that women pay for out of pocket. The history of the ban shows that general opposition to abortion, and particularly revulsion to abortions being performed on federal territory, has
driven its support.
A. History of the Ban
In 1978, Congress included language in the 1979 defense appropriations bill prohibiting the use of federal funds to perform abortions
on military bases except in cases of rape, incest, severe health consequences, or endangerment of the life of the mother. 3 However, women
could still informally obtain self-financed, or "pre-paid," abortions on
bases overseas. 4 In 1988, under the Reagan administration, the Department of Defense articulated a policy proscribing pre-paid abortions in military treatment facilities." The policy states, in part:
The informal practice of performing so called "pre-paid" abortions in very limited circumstances outside the United States
does not violate the legal prohibition [on defense funds used to
perform abortions except where the life of the mother is endangered]. However, it might suggest insensitivity to the spirit of the
Congressionally-enacted policy of withholding government involvement in the provision of abortions. It therefore appears appropriate to establish formally a uniform Department of Defense
policy in this regard. The policy is that the performance of pre16
paid abortions in military treatment facilities is not authorized.
During his first days in office, President Clinton reversed the ban
along with a host of other abortion regulations.'7 His subsequent policy
memorandum stated that women on overseas bases "should have access to abortion services comparable to that of women in the United
States."' 8 The policy allowed military health care providers to refrain
from participating in abortion procedures if they objected on moral or
ethical grounds. Further, the policy reaffirmed that, as under the for13 See Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1979 § 863, Pub L No 95-457, 92 Stat
1231,1254 (1978).
14 See William Mayer, DoD Policy Regarding Providing Non-funded Abortions in Outside the Continental United States Military Medical Treatment Facilities,Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments (Department of Defense June 21, 1988), online at
http://www.tricare.osd.mil/policy/memos/abortion.html (visited June 30,2004).
15 See id.
16 Id.
17 See Privately Funded Abortions at MilitaryHospitals, Memorandum for the Secretary
of
Defense, 58 Fed Reg 6439 (1993) (President Clinton stating that he deemed the ban unwarranted).
18 Stephen C. Joseph, Implementation of Policy Regarding Pre-paid Abortions in Military
Treatment Facilities, Memorandum for the Secretaries of the Military Departments
(Department of Defense May 9, 1994), online at http://www.tricare.osd.mil/policy/fy96/
abort30.html#Attachnent (visited June 30,2004).
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mer policy, host nation laws concerning abortion would be respected.
That is, an abortion could not be performed on a base located in a host
country where abortion was illegal. However, where an abortion could
not feasibly be performed in a certain military facility, the policy required the Military Health Services System to develop other means to
assure access to abortions for military personnel and dependents. Such
accommodations could include "supplementing facility staff with local
contract personnel, referrals to another military facility or to qualified
local civilian providers, consideration of travel to nearby locations, and
other appropriate steps."'9
The new abortion policy did not last long. Congress managed to
20
reinstate the ban in its 1996 defense authorization package. President
Clinton vetoed the package once, but ultimately signed it because it
contained a number of other provisions that he considered vital for
national defense and troop morale, including a pay raise." The statute
provides:
No medical treatment facility or other facility of the Department
of Defense may be used to perform an abortion except where the
life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried
to term or in a case in which the pregnancy is the result of an act
of rape or incest.
In subsequent years, Senators Patty Murray and Olympia Snowe
led unsuccessful efforts to repeal the ban in order to give servicewomen and female dependents the same access to abortion as their
stateside counterparts. During debates on the 2003 defense appropriations bill, a majority of the Senate voted to repeal the ban," but the
House voted to keep it in place. By the 2004 bill, the move to repeal
had lost some momentum, ' perhaps in part as a result of shifting priorities surrounding the war in Iraq. Thus, the ban remains in effect.
Possible Rationales for the Ban and Their Shortcomings
Congress set forth a number of different justifications for the
military abortion ban. The legislative history indicates two possible rationales: (1) a congressional policy of withholding government assisB.

19

Id.

20 See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 § 738, Pub L No 104-106,
110 Stat 186,384 (1996).
21 See Philip Shenon, Reluctantly, Clinton Signs Defense Bill, NY Tunes A33 (Feb 11, 1996)
(reporting that the "President felt that he had no choice ... because it contained a variety of
other provisions ... including a 2.4 percent military pay raise").
10 USC § 1093(b).
22
23 See Englin, SurrenderingRights, New Republic Online (cited in note 4).
24 See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004,149 Cong Rec at S 6911
(cited in note 3) (recording that the vote on an amendment to repeal the ban lost 48-51).
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tance from women seeking to obtain an abortion in order to avoid "a
Federal endorsement of the practice that is opposed by tens of millions of Americans";5 and (2) proposals to permit on-base abortions
did not include informational or administrative requirements common

to state abortion laws." Others have argued that repeal of the ban is

simply unnecessary because women may still obtain abortions by leaving the base. Military justifications for the ban include respect for the
abortion laws and customs of the country in which the base is located,
and concerns that military morale might be harmed by the incidence
of on-base abortions.a

The 1988 Department of Defense memorandum issuing the first
iteration of the policy did not mention military reasons for the law. In
fact, the only reason cited for the policy change was that allowing such
abortions might conflict with the established congressional policy of
eliminating any form of government involvement in the provision of
abortions. 2' The policy was entirely in line with other moves by the
Reagan Administration to limit access to abortion more generally. °

Congressional debates on the issue reveal that opposition to
abortion in general,' and especially to the possibility of federal funds
being used to subsidize abortions, 2 has driven support for the ban.
Supporters of the ban worry that if abortions were allowed to be per25
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, S 2549, 106th Cong, 2d Sess
(May 12,2000), in 146 Cong Rec S 5389,5407 (June 20,2000) (statement of Senator Hutchinson)
(noting that it was "a subsidizing of the abortion procedure").
26 See Authorizing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1993 for Military Activities
of the Department of Defense, S Rep No 102-352, 102d Cong, 2d Sess 411 (July 31, 1992) (statement
of Senator Coats) ("Let it be perfectly clear that members of Congress who support this language are in fact supporting an unrestricted entitlement to abortion on demand for any or for no
reason.").
27
See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, 146 Cong Rec at S 5407
(cited in note 25) (statement of Senator Hutchinson) (noting that the military will provide "transportation either to the United States or to another country where abortion is legal for only $10").
28 See text accompanying notes 35-42 for a discussion of these rationales.
29 Mayer, DoD Policy (cited in note 14).
30 President Reagan advocated a "Human Life Amendment," which would have made all
abortions illegal except when the life of the mother was in danger. See Ronald Reagan, 1988
Legislative and Administrative Message: A Union of Individuals, in 1 Public Papers of the
Presidents of the United States: Ronald Reagan 1988 91, 120 (GPO 1990) ("I am committed to
reducing the number of abortions in this country and reaffirming life's sacred position in our
Nation.").
31 See, for example, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2004, 149 Cong
Rec at S 6906 (cited in note 3) (statement of Senator Sessions) (citing poll data showing that
Americans generally support stricter limitations on abortion).
32 See, for example, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001,
146 Cong
Rec at S 5408 (cited in note 25) (statement of Senator Hutchinson). Senator Hutchinson concluded:
Let's pretend we are not subsidizing abortions. We know they are in military hospitals performed by military doctors paid by American taxpayers .... We know the equipment used
is bought and paid for by American taxpayers. But we are not really subsidizing it. That is a
legal myth and it simply does not measure up.
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formed on military bases, it would be impossible to ensure that, in ac33
cordance with the Hyde Amendment, no federal funds would be

used to perform the abortions." Although there is a military justification for efficient military spending, the concern here is not how much
money is being spent, but rather on what it is being spent. Supporters
on this ground would, in principle, be opposed to spending a single
dollar of taxpayer money on an abortion. This may be a legitimate political rationale, but it does not directly relate to military readiness or
efficiency. The same is true for the argument that permitting on-base
abortions would constitute a federal endorsement of the practice.

One military-related justification is the argument that the military should not conduct practices on its bases that host countries oppose. 5 However, when military abortions were permitted under the
Clinton administration, they could only be performed on bases in

countries that permitted abortion. In countries where abortion was
prohibited, women were to be referred to other military facilities or

'
transported to locations where abortion was legal. Therefore, respect
for host country laws and customs does not appear to demand that

abortions be prohibited on every military base. It is also true that the
military does not require conformity to all foreign laws and practices;

33 Act of Sept 30, 1976 § 209, Pub L No 94-439, 90 Stat 1418, 1434 (forbidding the use of
Medicaid funds to reimburse the cost of an abortion except in cases where the mother's life is
threatened). Later versions of the Hyde Amendment added exceptions for abortions in cases of
rape or incest. See Act of Nov 20, 1979 § 109, Pub L No 96-123, 93 Stat 923,926 (noting that the
rape or incest had to be reported promptly).
34 Supporters of the ban complain that it is currently not feasible "to collect billing information relative to a specific encounter within the military health care system." National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, 146 Cong Rec at S 5413 (cited in note 25) (statement of
Senator Hutchinson). But see National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, 149
Cong Rec at S 6909 (cited in note 3) (statement of Senator Snowe):
Every person who has ever been in a hospital for any type of procedure knows full well that
the hospital and the physician is able to account for every charge, the cost of every minute,
every physician, every nurse, each aspirin, the supplies, the materials, the overheads, the insurance, anything that is part of the procedure. Under this amendment [to reverse the ban],
every expense is included in the cost that is paid by private funds.

Senator Snowe's argument would also apply if a lack of willing military physicians necessitated
the hiring of contract physicians from the U.S., the host country, or neighboring countries. In any
event, it could be argued that the military "subsidizes" abortions under current policy in the
same way that it would if it allowed on-base abortions, because a servicewoman or military dependent seeking an abortion receives free transportation (as do all members of the military) to
her destination.
35 See, for example, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993,
HR 2100, 102d Cong, 1st Sess (Apr 25, 1991), in 137 Cong Rec H 3380, 3397 (May 22, 1991)
(statement of Representative Dornan) (introducing material from Cardinal John O'Connor stating: "If anything, [military hospitals] should be especially careful not to export abortion to host
countries whose traditions and legal policies respect unborn human life").
36 See Joseph, Implementation of Policy Regarding Pre-paid Abortions in Military Treatment Facilities(cited in note 18).
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for example, it is doubtful that it would observe a host country's policy
of racial or religious discrimination.37
The most frequently offered military justification for the abortion
ban is that permitting abortions could hurt the morale of the armed
forces. Senator Jeff Sessions has stated that allowing abortions on military bases "is not good for military morale. It is not going to improve
the self-image of the patriots who defend us every day."38 Senator Michael Enzi added that providing abortions on bases "runs contrary to
the mission of our armed services," which is to preserve human life."
On this theory, military personnel in general might be harmed by the
awareness that abortions are being performed on the base, or a particular individual might be adversely affected, such as a serviceman

who objects to his wife's decision to have an abortion.

While the goal of promoting morale is a legitimate one, it is diffi-

cult to prove that the means fit this end. The result is that morale
can often be used to justify either side of an argument, and can be

offered as a pretext for some underlying rationale. For example, until

President Truman's 1948 executive order, segregation of AfricanAmericans within the military was justified by morale arguments.0 For
this reason, some courts have bypassed the military's morale arguments where the actual effect on morale could not be proved. 1
Supporters of the ban could also argue that easy access to an

abortion might encourage sexual relations among soldiers, which
causes undesirable sexual tension. A similar defense was made (and

upheld) in the face of challenges to the ban on homosexuals in the
military.4 The legislative history of the military abortion ban does not
indicate that any such arguments have yet been made, and indeed, any

link between abortion access and sexual tension seems tenuous at

37 See, for example, Military Eases Policy; But Muslim-Dress Flap Continues for US.
Women, Newsday A32 (Jan 24, 2002) (reporting that the military no longer required servicewomen who traveled off base in Islamic countries to wear traditional abayas, or head-to-toe

robes).
38 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, 146 Cong Rec at
S 5416 (cited
in note 25) (statement of Senator Sessions) (noting that a majority of physicians in the military
were against abortion).
39 Id at 5413 (statement of Senator Enzi) (noting that the legislation against the ban would
call on military personnel to take innocent lives, not protect them).
40 See Watkins v United States Army, 875 F2d 699, 729 (9th Cir 1989) (en banc)
(Norris
concurring) ("As recently as World War II both the Army chief of staff and the Secretary of the
Navy justified racial segregation in the ranks as necessary to maintain efficiency, discipline, and
morale.").
41 See id at 709 (concluding that re-enlisting an openly gay serviceman does
not cause any
harm to the public interest or the Army). See also Holmes v CaliforniaArmy National Guard,
920 F Supp 1510, 1531-34 (ND Cal 1996) (holding that the ban on homosexuals in the military
failed to rationally further a military purpose), revd, 124 F3d 1126 (9th Cir 1997).
42 See, for example, Holmes, 124 F3d at 1133 (recognizing that the government
has a legitimate interest in excluding from military service those who engage in homosexual conduct).
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best; sexual tension is no doubt inevitable at some level, and is
unlikely to be affected by enhanced or reduced abortion access.
Thus, even though the history of the ban suggests that the primary reason for the ban was to limit federal involvement in abortion,
at least two military rationales have been offered, and others may exist. As I argue in Part III, the lack of strong military reasons weighs in
favor of casting a more critical eye toward the ban, whether through
the undue burden standard or rational basis review.
II. BACKGROUND LAW

The military abortion ban intertwines two very different areas of
the law: the due process right to an abortion and Congress's wide latitude to prescribe military policy. While courts have invalidated on
constitutional grounds legislation that restricts access to an abortion,
they have generally been loath to strike down laws regulating the military. In this Part, I lay out the standards of review applied to restrictions on the constitutional rights of military personnel (rational basis
review) and to restrictions on abortion (the undue burden standard).
Rational basis review requires a rational connection to a legitimate
governmental purpose. Abortion law considers restrictions to be illegitimate if their purpose is to put substantial obstacles in the path of a
woman exercising her right to an abortion. Thus, I conclude that abortion restrictions that serve only this impermissible purpose would fail
both the undue burden standard and rational basis review.
A. Review of Military Regulations
This Part considers the tradition of deferential judicial review of
both congressional legislation regarding the military and individual
military decisions that have the effect of curtailing the constitutional
rights of military personnel. Cases that uphold individual rights over
military decisionmaking indicate that courts balance actual (as opposed to articulated) military interests with individual rights before
granting deference in any particular case.
1. Why deference?
The Supreme Court has held that "judicial deference ... is at its

apogee when legislative action under the congressional authority to
raise and support armies and make rules and regulations for their
governance is challenged."" Deferential "rational basis review" has
been extended to military policy and regulations ranging from capital

Rostker v Goldberg, 453 US 57,70 (1981) (upholding the Military Selective Service Act's
43
application exclusively to men).
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punishment" to the male-only draft.4 Even in Korematsu v United
'

States, which established the strict scrutiny standard for statutory distinctions on the basis of race or national origin, the Court was so concerned with giving Congress flexibility in matters of military crisis that
it applied a level of review that more closely resembled rational basis
review.47 However, as a result of decisions like Korematsu, one of the

most reviled opinions in Supreme Court history, courts may be more
wary of infringing upon constitutional rights without a valid military
justification.:
Courts give deference to military authority based on principles
that apply to the other branches of government more generally, and

for reasons that apply specifically to the military. First, because the
Constitution vests Congress and the Executive with supremacy over

the military," courts owe the military the same kind of deference that
administrative agencies receive. This principle justifies the generally
deferential nature of rational basis review on grounds such as the
separation of powers doctrine, administrative expertise, and limited
judicial competence." But courts are especially deferential to the military as a separate community with the purpose of maintaining national security.2 When its policies are challenged, the military typically
defends them on grounds that relate to national security. Among the

goals most often cited are cohesion, loyalty, good order, discipline, and

4
See Loving v United States, 517 US 748,768-69 (1996) (upholding Congress's delegation
to the president of the authority to define factors for the death penalty in military capital cases).
45 See Rostker, 453 US at 83 (refusing to make an "independent evaluation of the evidence" and relying on congressional justifications instead).
46 323 US 214 (1944).
47 Id at 223 (upholding as constitutional the internment of Japanese Americans during
World War II).
48 See, for example, Hirabayashiv United States, 828 F2d 591,593-94 (9th Cir 1997)
(noting
that the military decision at issue in Korematsu was in reality based on racial stereotypes and
that there was no emergency calling for internment).
49 US Const Art I, § 8, cl12-16 (vesting in Congress the right to establish, maintain, and
regulate the armed forces); Art II, § 2, cI 1 (establishing the president as commander-in-chief of
the armed forces).
50 See Kelly E. Henriksen, Comment, Gays, the Military,and JudicialDeference: When the
Courts Must Reclaim Equal Protection as Their Area of Expertise, 9 Admin L JAm U 1273, 127778 (1996) (noting that courts have stated that the separation of powers doctrine requires such
deference).
51 See Earl Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military,37 NYU L Rev 181,187 (1962):
The most obvious reason [for the Supreme Court's "hands off" attitude] is that courts are
ill-equipped to determine the impact upon discipline that any particular intrusion upon
military authority might have. Many of the problems of the military society are, in a sense,
alien to the problems with which the judiciary is trained to deal.
52
See Captain John A. Carr, Free Speech in the Military Community: Striking a Balancebetween PersonalRights and Military Necessity, 45 AF L Rev 303, 307-08 (1998) (noting that this
deference "has both supporters and critics").
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morale. 3 In the context of restricting homosexual conduct in the military, reduction of sexual tension and increased privacy have also been
upheld as rational military goals."
Some regulations are more tailored toward military interests than
others. For example, proscription of active opposition to military policy by a member of the armed forces prevents dissension that could
"undermine the effectiveness of response to command."" Thus, the
circumscription of free speech in this context is fairly construed as being rationally related to legitimate (indeed, important) military interests. But courts have sometimes been extremely deferential even
when regulations infringe upon otherwise near-sacred rights to
achieve results that seem only minimally related to military efficiency
and readiness. For example, in Goldman v Weinberger,'6 the Supreme
Court upheld a regulation prohibiting indoor use of headgear as applied to an Orthodox Jewish psychologist wearing a yarmulke on an
Air Force base." Although Goldman's military duties were "performed in a setting in which a modest departure from the uniform
regulation creates almost no danger of impairment of the Air Force's
military mission, ' ' the Court held that "the First Amendment does
not require the military to accommodate such practices in the face of
its view that they would detract from the uniformity sought by the
dress regulations."'" However, as Justice O'Connor objected in her
dissent:
The Court rejects Captain Goldman's claim without even the
slightest attempt to weigh his asserted right to the free exercise
of his religion against the interest of the Air Force .... No test for
free exercise claims in the military context is even articulated,
much less applied. It is entirely sufficient for the Court if the military perceives a need for uniformity.6
See id (noting "the critical importance of obedience and subordination").
See Able v United States, 155 F3d 628, 634 (2d Cir 1998) (noting that concerns for unit
cohesion, reduced sexual tension, and the promotion of personal privacy "distinguish the military
from civilian life and go directly to the military's need[s]").
55 United States v Priest,45 CMR 338,344 (1972) (punishing a soldier for publishing an underground newsletter that disparaged the government and military). See also Parker v Levy, 417
US 733, 760-61 (1974) (upholding the conviction of an Army doctor who urged AfricanAmerican enlisted men not to go to Vietnam).
475 US 503 (1986).
56
57 Id at 504 (noting that the Air Force's "strong interest in discipline justified the strict enforcement of its uniform dress requirements").
58 Id at 511 (Stevens concurring) (noting that the Court should consider the regulation as
applied to all personnel of all religions, and not simply as applied to this individual).
59
Id at 509-10 (majority) (noting that it was acceptable for the Air Force to draw the line
between religious apparel that is visible and that which is not).
60 Id at 528-29 (O'Connor dissenting) (noting that the Court should articulate "an appropriate standard for a free exercise claim in the military context").
53

54
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Similarly, Justice Blackmun complained that the majority deferred to the military without demanding a reasonable justification for
its decision:
Reasoned military judgments, of course, are entitled to respect,
but the military has failed to show that this particular judgment
with respect to Captain Goldman is a reasoned one. If, in
the future, the Air Force is besieged with requests for religious
exemptions from the dress code, and those requests cannot be
distinguished on functional grounds from Goldman's, the service
may be able to argue credibly that circumstances warrant a flat
rule against any visible religious apparel. That, however, would
be a case different from the one at hand.'
The Court's lack of concern with the burden on a litigant's constitutional rights and its unwillingness to review the military's judgment
is fairly typical of jurisprudence involving the military.. In short,
courts will often bend over backward to uphold decisions made by,
and with regard to, the military.
2. Dispensing with deference: demanding a real military reason.
Deference to the military notwithstanding, courts do occasionally
uphold the individual rights of servicepersons and their dependents
against military restrictions. Courts tend to cast a more critical eye
upon those restrictions that seem to be least related to military purposes. In Reid v Covert,6 the Supreme Court set forth a pair of important propositions concerning the constitutional rights of military personnel and their civilian dependents. First, when the United States acts
against its citizens abroad, it cannot do so free of constitutional safeguards on individual rights.m Second, the power of Congress "[t]o
make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval
Forces" ' does not extend to civilians, although they may be dependents living with servicemen on a military base. Yet although courts
61 Id at 527-28 (Blackmun dissenting) (noting that it was an empirical question whether
many individuals would come forward seeking religious exemptions, and that the Air Force had
provided no such showing).
62 See generally C. Thomas Dienes, When the First Amendment Is Not Preferred:
The Military and Other "Special Contexts" 56 U Cin L Rev 779, 799-827 (1988) (discussing Goldman and
Parker and the rationales for the limitations in this context).
63 354 US 1 (1957).
64 See id at 5-6 ("When the Government reaches out to punish a citizen who is abroad, the
shield which the Bill of Rights and other parts of the Constitution provide to protect his life and
liberty should not be stripped away.").
65 US Const Art I, § 8, cl 14.
66 See Reid, 354 US at 19-20 ("The wives of servicemen are no more members of the 'land
and naval Forces' when living at a military post in England or Japan than when living at a base in
this country."). This obviously has implications for dependents on foreign military bases who
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frequently recite the principle that "our citizens in uniform may not be
stripped of basic rights simply because they have doffed their civilian
7 those rights have not always been upheld against the exerclothes,""

cise of military authority.However, the case law shows that, generally speaking, courts will

not use deferential review for those military decisions that least benefit military preparedness at the expense of fundamental constitutional
rights. For example, courts over the past thirty years have routinely
struck down military regulations relating to women and minorities as
violating the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses." Remarka-

bly, the only Supreme Court decision ever to apply strict scrutiny to a
sex-based classification was a case involving the military. In Frontiero

v Richardson,7° which dealt with the statutory difference in treatment
of male and female military personnel in terms of their "dependent"
benefits, the Court treated the military like any other government
employer.7' Moreover, in Berkley v United States,7 the Federal Circuit
recently held that the policy of giving deference to the military does

not permit a trial court to review a military policy under the rational
basis standard when it contains a classification that would normally be
subject to strict scrutiny. 3 Instead of building deference into the standard of review, the court suggested that the requisite deference should

be layered into the judicial application of strict scrutiny.4
Perhaps most importantly, there is precedent applying strict scrutiny not only in military cases involving suspect classifications, but also
in cases involving military restrictions upon those rights protected by
the Due Process Clause as being most "fundamental." In O'Neill v

seek access to an abortion.
Warren, 37 NYU L Rev at 188 (cited in note 51) (noting that since the military has such
67
a huge impact on the lives of millions of citizens, judicial deference might be unwarranted).
See, for example, Dash v Commanding General, 429 F2d 427, 428 (4th Cir 1970) (per
68
curiam) (affirming the constitutionality of a regulation restricting First Amendment expressive
activities).
69
See Frontierov Richardson, 411 US 677,688 (1973) (plurality) (holding unconstitutional
a statute that required only female servicemembers to prove a spouse's dependence); Crawford v
Cushman, 531 F2d 1114, 1116 (2d Cir 1976) (striking down a Marine Corps regulation providing
for automatic discharge of any pregnant woman). Although the Crawford court did not discuss a
heightened standard, the court commented that the discharge rule was "simply not constitutionally tailored to promote" the military's legitimate interest in insuring the mobility and readiness
of its personnel. Id at 1122.
70
411 US 677 (1973) (plurality).
71 Id at 688.
72
287 F3d 1076 (Fed Cir 2002).
73
Id at 1091 (reversing the trial court on the ground that strict scrutiny, not rational basis,
was the appropriate standard to be applied to an Air Force policy that treated women and minority officers differently from other officers with regard to involuntary termination).
74 See id ("[W]e do not reach the question of what effect, if any, deference to the military
would have on the judicial application of strict scrutiny.").
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Dent," the Eastern District of New York struck down the United
States Merchant Marine Academy's76 prohibition on marriages for all
cadets prior to graduation." The court acknowledged the longstanding

tradition of deference to the military, yet it puzzled over whether to
exercise strict scrutiny or the intermediate "substantial relation" standard," under both of which the prohibition would fail, or whether to
exercise rational basis scrutiny, under which the ban would survive.

With a fundamental right at issue, the court chose strict scrutiny, holding that "[flor the government to invoke this possibility of justification
it must show the clearest kind of imperative, and lack of alternative."79
Thus, although the overwhelming number of military regulations
are upheld under rational basis scrutiny, there are instances where the

constitutional right at stake trumps the military rationale. These instances most often involve a pairing of those rights deemed most fundamental with those restrictions most tangentially related to military
preparedness.' °
B.

Abortion Law: The Undue Burden Standard
In 1973, the Supreme Court in Roe v Wade held that the right to

an elective abortion was protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's
364 F Supp 565 (ED NY 1973).
The Merchant Marine Academy operates under the Department of Commerce, but the
court recognized that it served military purposes and therefore considered the military deference
issue. See id at 571-72,576.
77 Id at 580.
78 Id at 577-78. With regard to the "substantial relation" test, the court noted:
75

76

[T]he Supreme Court has moved away from a rigid dichotomy between the "compelling
state interest" test and the "minimal scrutiny" test, adopting, at least in some cases, "a more
flexible and equitable approach, which permits consideration to be given to evidence of the
nature of the unequal classification under attack, the nature of the rights adversely affected,
and the governmental interest urged in support of it. Under this approach the test for application of the Equal Protection Clause is whether the legislative classification is in fact substantially related to the object of the statute."
Id, citing Boraas v Village of Belle Terre, 476 F2d 806,814 (2d Cir 1973).
79 O'Neill, 364 F Supp at 579, quoting Anderson v Laird,466 F2d 283,302 (DC Cir 1972)
(Leventhal concurring).
80 The Fifth Circuit has proposed a test for reviewability of military claims that makes explicit this balancing of private and military interests. See Mindes v Seaman, 453 F2d 197,201-02
(5th Cir 1971). The court proposed a four-factor test that considers (1) "[t]he nature and strength
of the plaintiff's challenge to the military determination," (2) "[t]he potential injury to the plaintiff if review is refused," (3) "[t]he type and degree of anticipated interference with the military
function" posed by review, and (4) "[t]he extent to which the exercise of military expertise or discretion is involved." Id. The court concluded that "[clourts should defer to the superior knowledge and experience of professionals in matters such as promotions or orders directly related to
specific military functions." Id. Although this test has been used primarily to determine justiciability of claims, it also lends itself to the determination of the appropriate standard of review and
the outcome on the merits.
81 410 US 113 (1973).
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implicit guarantee of privacy. The Court found that governmental
regulation of abortion must withstand strict scrutiny, meaning that the
regulation must serve a compelling state intereste and must be narrowly tailored to protect only the state interests at stake. The Court
recognized state interests in both the health of the mother and the life
of the fetus. These state interests increased with each trimester of
86

pregnancy.
Nearly two decades later, after a number of cases that left the
appropriate standard of review in some doubt, the Court explicitly
rejected Roe's trimester framework in Planned Parenthoodof Southeastern Pennsylvania v Casey. The plurality opinion of Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter reaffirmed the central holding of Roe,
upholding both a woman's right to an abortion during the pre-viability
term without undue interference from the state and the state's right to
restrict abortion after viability, provided that the law contains an exception for both the life and health of the mother. But the Casey plurality also adopted a new standard-that of the "undue burden." According to Casey, "Only where state regulation imposes an undue burden on a woman's ability to make this decision does the power of the
State reach into the heart of the liberty protected by the Due Process
Clause." °
The "undue burden" standard was intended, in part, to give adequate weight to the state's interest; whether a burden is "undue" depends on the degree of infringement upon the abortion right relative
to the importance of the state interest served. Casey holds that the
Id at 152-53 (noting that the right of privacy may be justified by the Ninth Amendment's
82
reservation of rights to the people as well).
Id at 163-64 (noting that the "compelling" point with regard to the protection of poten83
tial life was at the viability of the fetus).
84 Id at 155 (citing several illustrative cases).
85
Id at 159 (noting that the woman's right to privacy must be weighed against the interests
of the potential human life).
86 The Court decided that the state-proffered interests in the life of the fetus were "compelling" only after the first trimester of pregnancy; thus, first-trimester abortions could not be
regulated by the state. After the first trimester, the state's interest in the health of the mother became compelling; therefore, reasonable health regulations were permissible during the stage after the first trimester. The state interest in the potential life of the fetus became compelling at the
point of viability, after which the state could regulate or even proscribe abortion for the protection of the fetus, except when the life or health of the mother was threatened. See id at 164-65.
87
For example, in Webster v Reproductive Health Services, 492 US 490, 518-19 (1989), the
Court criticized the trimester framework as somewhat arbitrary, but did not explicitly overrule it
until Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v Casey, 505 US 833,873 (1992) (plurality). Justice Blackmun, writing in dissent in Webster, considered the plurality's test "nothing more
than a dressed-up version of rational basis review." 492 US at 555.
88 505 US 833,873 (1992) (plurality).
89 See id at 846 (majority) ("[T]he essential holding of Roe v. Wade should be retained and
once again reaffirmed.").
90 Id at 874 (plurality) (citing cases).

2004]

The Statutory Ban on Abortions on Military Bases

1565

state can never promote its interest in fetal life in a way that trumps a
mother's pre-viability privacy right to an abortion: "[W]e answer the
question, left open in previous opinions discussing the undue burden
formulation, whether a law designed to further the State's interest in
fetal life which imposes an undue burden on the woman's decision before fetal viability could be constitutional .... The answer is no."'"
Subsequent case law suggests that laws that only promote the
state's interest in fetal life tend to place greater burdens on a woman's
right to choose than laws that also promote the state's interest in the
mother's health or in other administrative concerns. For example, in
Stenberg v Carhart,9 in which the Supreme Court struck down Nebraska's ban on partial birth abortions, the Court gave greater weight
to the health of the mother than to the state's interest in fetal life. 3 As
long as a given procedure is preferred by some physicians for health
reasons, it is likely to be upheld even if it is one which, "in the State's
reasonable determination, might cause the medical profession or society as a whole to become insensitive, even disdainful, to life, including
life in the human fetus.' As discussed at greater length in Part II.C,
this suggests that laws with the sole purpose of restricting or prohibiting pre-viability abortions for the sake of the state's interest in fetal
life are per se illegitimate. That is to say, although the state's interest in
promoting fetal life is a legitimate one, that interest cannot be legitimately furthered by a law whose purpose is illegitimate: not to promote fetal life by educating, informing, or persuading, but to do so
simply by making an abortion more difficult to access. Thus, a restriction whose sole purpose is illegitimate imposes a burden that is per se
undue; no further factual inquiry is required.
C.

Restricting Abortion for Illegitimate Purposes: Merging
the Standards

Courts have used both the undue burden standard and rational
basis review to strike down anti-abortion laws that have improper
purposes. Under both standards, courts balance the importance of the
abortion right against the worthiness of the state's purpose in restricting abortion access. Although I argue in Part III that both the purpose
and the effect of the military abortion ban is to impose undue burdens
on abortion access, I focus first on the "purpose" part of the Casey in-

91 Id at 877 (allowing regulations so long as they are not an obstacle to the "woman's right
to make the ultimate decision").
92 530 US 914 (2000).
93 See id at 930-31.
94 Id at 961 (Kennedy dissenting).
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quiry to show that an abortion restriction with an impermissible purpose not only is unduly burdensome, but also lacks a rational basis.
Casey held that "[a] finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for
the conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion
of a nonviable fetus."95 Further, "[a] statute with this purpose is invalid
because the means chosen by the State to further the interest in potential life must be calculated to inform the woman's free choice, not
hinder it."' Courts have subsequently read Casey to hold that the state
may not restrict abortion for the illegitimate purpose of making it
harder to access;" thus, the burden inflicted by a restriction enacted
for that purpose is per se undue. Read this way, an abortion restriction
may be struck down either on the basis of its illegitimate purpose or
for its overly burdensome effect.9
This alone, however, does not answer the question of what purposes are legitimate. Casey recognized that promoting both the health
of the mother and the life of the fetus are legitimate state interests,
but established that the latter purpose could not be legitimately
served by laws whose purpose is simply to set up roadblocks to abortion. As the Seventh Circuit put it:

505 US at 877 (plurality).
Id (emphasis added) (noting that protecting fetal life was a permissible goal, but that
putting an obstacle in front of a woman's right to choose was an impermissible means).
97 See Okpalobi v Foster, 190 F3d 337,354 (5th Cir 1999) (reading Casey as requiring lower
courts "to determine whether a regulation has the 'purpose' of imposing an undue burden on a
woman's right to seek an abortion"), revd on other grounds, 244 F3d 405,409 (5th Cir 2001) (en
banc). See also Jane L. v Bangerter,102 F3d 1112, 1117 (10th Cir 1996) (concluding that a statute
fixing viability at twenty weeks "was enacted with the specific purpose of placing an
insurmountable obstacle in the path of a woman seeking the nontherapeutic abortion of a nonviable fetus after twenty weeks, and it therefore imposes an unconstitutional undue burden on
her right to choose under Casey").
98 It remains an open question whether a law can be unduly burdensome because its purpose is impermissible even if its effects are permissible. See Mazurek v Armstrong, 520 US 968,
972 (1997) (per curiam) (finding no improper legislative purpose in that case "even assuming ...
that a legislative purpose to interfere with the constitutionally protected right to abortion without the effect of interfering with that right... could render the Montana law invalid"). See also
Carhart,530 US at 1008 n 19 (Thomas dissenting) ("Justice Ginsburg [concurring] seems to suggest that even if the Nebraska statute does not impose an undue burden on women seeking
abortions, the statute is unconstitutional because it has the purpose of imposing an undue burden."). However, the resolution of this question is not necessary to the outcome of a challenge to
the military abortion ban, because the ban's effect as well as its purpose is impermissible. To say
that an abortion law has an impermissible purpose but permissible effects must mean, first, that
the law fails to fully effectuate its impermissible purpose of substantially burdening the abortion
right, and second, that the law serves some other, legitimate purpose. In this case, I argue that the
military abortion ban accomplishes the illegitimate purpose of burdening the abortion right and
lacks any other legitimate purpose, such that it fails both undue burden and rational basis analyses.
95

96
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[A] state may advance its legitimate interest in potential life by
enacting measures designed to ensure that a woman's choice is
informed and mature as long as the purpose of such measures is
to persuade the woman to choose childbirth over abortion rather
than to prevent the woman from exercising her right to choose."
Several courts have struck down abortion restrictions on grounds
that they prevented choice rather than persuaded its exercise. In holding unconstitutionally vague a statute making Louisiana abortion providers liable in tort for all damages occasioned by an abortion, the
Fifth Circuit in Okpalobi v Foster'0 noted that it must not "accept the
government's proffered purpose if it is a mere 'sham.""0 ' The statute at
issue, which the court described as "disingenuous," provided no indication as to how physicians could avoid liability, other than to stop performing abortions.'° Likewise, in Jane L. v Bangerter,"O the Tenth Circuit invalidated Utah's attempt to fix viability at twenty weeks as having an impermissible purpose."4 The Court noted that "the Utah legislature's intent in passing the abortion provisions was to provide a vehicle by which to challenge Roe v. Wade, as demonstrated by the legislature's establishment of an abortion litigation trust account. ' 5 Thus, a
statute designed merely to reduce the overall number of abortions by
making abortion harder to access has an impermissible purpose. But
when reasonable minds may differ about the purpose of a statute, a
court will uphold it."'
My point in discussing the "purpose" part of the Casey inquiry is
to establish that the Supreme Court has held that imposing obstacles
to abortion is an illegitimate governmental goal. Though I argue in
Part III.B.1 that the undue burden standard is the appropriate framework within which to review the military abortion ban, there is always
a chance that a court could choose the more deferential rational basis
99 Karlin v Foust, 188 F3d 446, 493 (7th Cir 1999) (upholding abortion regulations relying
on the legislature's stated permissible purposes in enacting them and the plaintiffs inability to
bring forward any evidence of impermissible purposes).
100 190 F3d 337 (5th Cir 1999).
101 Id at 354 (looking for guidance from other constitutional areas in which the legislative
purpose has to be discerned, including voting rights and Establishment Clause cases).
102 See id at 356-57 (noting that the statute would drive abortion providers out of business).
103 102 F3d 1112 (10th Cir 1996).
104 Idat1ll7.
105 Id at 1116 (noting that purpose was to be found "from the structure of the legislation
and from examination of the process that led to its enactment").
106 See, for example, A Woman's Choice-East Side Women's Clinic v Newman, 305 F3d 684,
693 (7th Cir 2002) (upholding a twenty-four-hour informed consent provision that required a
woman to receive information "in the presence" of her doctor, necessitating two visits to the
clinic or hospital). Judge Wood, dissenting, noted that there was no evidence showing that the
"'in the presence' requirement actually furthered the state's legitimate interests in maternal
health or in protecting potential life." Id at 716.
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review. To say that a law passes rational basis review simply means
that it satisfies the minimal due process requirement that it be rationally related to a legitimate state interest."° If the purpose of a law is illegitimate under the undue burden standard, it should be equally ille-

gitimate under the rational basis standard.
Though courts normally do not have occasion to review abortion
restrictions under the rational basis standard, two cases suggest that
rational basis review of abortion restrictions involves more than a
simple nod to legitimate state interests. In fact, these courts exercised
rational basis review to strike down abortion restrictions as applied to
fetuses with "lethal anomalies" on grounds that the restrictions were
not rationally related to the statutory purpose of promoting the life of
the fetus where the fetus will not live to term.' ° Britell v United Statesl1
is of particular interest because it involved the denial of coverage for
an abortion of an anencephalic"' fetus by the Civilian Health and
Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS), the mili-

tary's health insurer."' The insurer denied coverage because federal
law prohibits the use of Defense Department funds "to perform abortions except where the life of the mother would be endangered if the
fetus were carried to term. 112 Although the Supreme Court has upheld
such restrictions on funds, the Britell court held that the purpose of
protecting fetal life is not served when applied to fetuses with no hope
of survival after birth. "3 Importantly, the court also found that, despite

the deference normally accorded legislative funding decisions, deference was not appropriate because the costs associated with carrying

107 See, for example, Lawrence v Texas, 539 US 558, 579 (2003) (O'Connor concurring)
("Under our rational basis standard of review, 'legislation is presumed to be valid and will be
sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest."'), citing City of Cleburne v Cleburne Living Center,Inc, 473 US 432,440 (1985).
108 See Karlin, 188 F3d at 489 n 16; Britell v United States, 204 F Supp 2d 182, 185 (D Mass
2002). Karlin held:

[Tihe mandatory provision of information relating to a father's child support obligations
and the availability of state childrearing assistance serves no legitimate state interest and
makes little sense under the circumstances. We fail to see how the provision of this largely
irrelevant information helps a woman "facilitate the wise exercise of [her abortion] right."
188 F3d at 489 n 16, quoting Casey, 505 US at 887.
109204 F Supp 2d 182 (D Mass 2002).
110 An anencephalic fetus is one that develops without a forebrain or cerebrum. If an anencephalic infant is not stillborn, he or she will usually die within a few days after birth. See Anencephaly Information, online at http://www.anencephaly.net/anencephaly.html (visited July 1,
2004) (noting that "[t]he infant is usually blind, deaf unconscious, and unable to feel pain").
IIIBritell, 204 F Supp 2d at 183 (noting that anencephaly was explicitly mentioned in the
federal regulations denying medical coverage for fetal abnormalities).
112 10USC§ 1093(a).
113 Britell, 204 F Supp 2d at 194-95 (distinguishing the constitutionality of bans on assisted
suicides for terminally ill individuals).
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the child to term (which would have been covered by CHAMPUS) far
exceeded the cost of Britell's abortion.
Although the regulation was applied to Britell, the dependent of
a military officer, and concerned the expenditure of defense funds, the
court did not discuss military deference. However, the court specifically rejected post hoc, morality-based justifications for the denial of
coverage: "If the only rationale offered for a statute is a general, morality-based concern, evidenced nowhere in the record, and not
hashed out in the legislative process, any statute could pass muster..".
Although the two anencephalic fetus cases do not speak in terms of
"illegitimate purpose," they illustrate that even abortion restrictions
driven by legitimate state interests will not 1always
be upheld under
6
even the most deferential standard of review.'
In summary, the undue burden standard has been fleshed out to
mean that laws that more clearly appear to protect a mother's health
are usually valid, whereas laws that aim to protect fetal life by impairing a woman's pre-viability access to an abortion are often invalidated.
Some of the more severe limitations on abortion access have been invalidated as having an illegitimate purpose. Those regulations that
have an illegitimate purpose can also be seen as lacking a rational
(read: permissible) basis. Abortion cases applying rational basis review
show that courts will look closely at the fit between a restriction's
means and ends.
III. ILLEGITIMATE PURPOSE OF RESTRICTING ABORTION: WHY THE
MILITARY ABORTION BAN'S BURDENS ARE PER SE UNDUE

An analysis of the military abortion ban reveals that (1) it heavily
burdens the ability of women on foreign bases to obtain an abortion;
and (2) military justifications are largely pretextual, and to the extent
that they are legitimate, the ban is overbroad. A reviewing court will
likely take into account the strengths of these competing military and

114 See id at 195-96 (noting that because the costs of determining which fetuses have anencephaly are low, it would not increase costs to allow abortions only for anencephalic fetuses).
115 Id at 194. In the context of military regulations, the same could be said for morale-based
justifications like those advanced by members of Congress in support of the military abortion
ban. See Part I.B.
116 This suggests that these courts applied a more rigorous rational basis scrutiny typical of
cases involving a "bare desire to harm" a politically unpopular group, see, for example, Romer v
Evans, 517 US 620,634 (1996) (striking down a state constitutional provision prohibiting any law
designed to protect homosexual persons); Cleburne, 473 US at 446-47 (striking down an ordinance that prevented an organization from operating a facility for the mentally disabled), rather
than the extremely deferential traditional rational basis review, see Williamson v Lee Optical of
Oklahoma, Inc, 348 US 483,487-88 (1955) ("It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to
correct it.").

1570

The University of Chicago Law Review

[71:1549

private interests in both selecting a standard of review and deciding
the merits of the case. In this Part, I explain that the attenuated relationship between the ban and military interests leads to the conclusion
that the undue burden framework provides the appropriate standard
of review. Given that the purpose of restricting access to abortion is illegitimate, and military justifications are pretextual, I conclude that
the ban is unduly burdensome. However, if a court chooses rational
basis review, the same illegitimate purpose and pretextual military justifications that make the ban unduly burdensome should lead that
court to conclude that the ban also lacks a rational basis.
A. Analyzing Burdens and Justifications
1. Burdens.
The practical reality is that the ban seriously infringes upon a
woman's right to procure an abortion. Currently, a woman on a foreign military base who wishes to obtain an abortion must either return
to the United States or seek an abortion within the host country or a
nearby country. This creates risks that include denial of leave by a
commanding officer, invasion of privacy, delay, inability to communicate with the operating physician, and substandard medical facilities
or treatment.
A woman who seeks an off-base abortion will likely have to obtain leave from her commanding officer, which may well require revealing the circumstances of her request."7 Her superior may then
choose to postpone or deny her request. Even if leave is granted, access to timely transportation is not guaranteed. While military personnel and their dependents may travel on military transport at no charge
on a space-available basis,"8 a woman seeking an abortion may not
have the same access to transportation as those with other medical
needs."9 Nor does a woman receive medical leave for an abortion, so
117 See Englin, SurrenderingRights, New Republic Online (cited in note 4) ("Since it is ultimately a woman's superiors who determine if she can take leave, when, and for how long ...
[the ban on abortions on military bases] effectively shifts the right and the burden of reproductive choice to those commanders and supervisors.").
118 See Karen Weil, Adventure Is Just a "Hop" Away: How to Take a Space A Flight, Fort
Huachuca Scout B3 (Jan 15, 2004), online at http://www.tradoc.army.mil/paolWebspecials/
H andPWB/012504.htm (visited Aug 2, 2004). Although one employee boasts, "We go places
that don't even have terminals," another officer warns, "You have to be flexible in the amount of
time you're willing to spend (in another city or country), because a flight may not leave from
(that place) for days, or even weeks." Id.
119 See Technical Corrections and Corrections to Enrollment of Certain Appropriations
Acts, H J Res 157, 102d Cong, 1st Sess (Feb 28,1991), in 137 Cong Rec S 17540, 17588-90 (Nov
22, 1991) (statement of Senator Lautenberg). Senator Lautenberg had the entire text of a letter
from Dr. Jeffrey T. Jensen added to the record. Dr. Jensen noted:

[A]ir transport for military on leave is on a "space available" basis only, and flights do not

2004]

The Statutory Ban on Abortions on Military Bases

1571

any extra time away from base that is necessitated by travel will presumably be counted in vacation days or time for which she is not paid.
In addition, health risks and legal complications increase with any
substantial delay.2 On the other hand, denial of leave would certainly

impose an undue burden upon a servicewoman because it would force
her to choose between getting an abortion and going absent without
leave.

If travel to the United States is not feasible, a woman must look
for an abortion provider in the host country, provided that abortion is
legal there. Health care standards and practices differ from nation to

nation; a woman who leaves base may be subjected to much lower
standards of medical expertise, safety, and cleanliness than would exist
at the military facility. One military officer reports that a woman from
her battalion who obtained an off-base abortion in Germany ' received no painkiller for the procedure and could barely understand
instructions given in the provider's broken English.'2 One can imagine
worse scenarios, particularly in host countries where abortion is illegal
or where medical facilities are substandard.
2. Justifications.
Justifications for the military abortion ban can be divided into
reasons that have to do with the military context ("military justifications"), and generic reasons for restricting abortion ("civil justifications"). I separate these justifications because, in Part III.B, I argue
that civil justifications alone are insufficient either to withstand an
undue burden analysis or to justify the exercise of a deferential rational basis review. Only genuine military necessity can justify the
burdens on a woman's choice or provide a legitimate, rational basis

occur every day.... You may not sign up on the wait list for a flight until you are in a leave
status, so chargeable leave time accumulates while you wait.... This further increases time
away from work[,] anxiety, and expense.
Id at 17589. Because women are not given medical leave to procure an abortion, a woman seeking an abortion must wait for her supervisor's permission before even signing up for a flight.
120 See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, 148 Cong Rec at S 5826
(cited in note 4) (statement of Senator Murray) (noting that there are serious risks in delaying
an abortion).
121 Although abortion is technically prohibited in Germany, women who choose to obtain
abortions during the first trimester will not be prosecuted as long as they first receive counseling
designed to convince them not to terminate their pregnancy. See Questions & Answers about
Germany: Health Care, Health Issues and Social Welfare, online at http://www.germanyinfo.org/
relaunchlinfo/facts/facts/questions-enhealthlhealthissues3.htm (visited July 1,2004).
122 See Letter from Lieutenant General Claudia J. Kennedy (retired) to Senate on Abortion
Ban for Women in the Military, online at http://www.crlp.org/hilljItr-0602mil.html (visited July 1,
2004) (noting also that the modesty of the soldier had been violated due to different cultural
norms about nudity).
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for the ban. In this Part, I suggest that genuine military justifications
are lacking.
a) Civil justifications. There are several overlapping civil justifications for the military ban, including the desire to restrict abortion,
the desire not to entangle taxpayer funds in the provision of abortion,
and the desire not to perform abortions in federal facilities. As explained in Part II.C, policies that only serve the purpose of restricting
abortion impose a burden that is per se undue. Although the purpose
of withholding taxpayer funding for abortions has been upheld as legitimate,' the military ban extends to privately funded abortions.
While some lawmakers have questioned the government's ability to
pass on all costs related to an abortion, it hardly seems impossible
given that private insurance companies routinely undertake such billing inquiries.'4 In any event, where serious measures have been taken
to ensure that public funds will not be used to subsidize abortion, the
denial of the fundamental right to an abortion cannot be legitimately
justified by billing concerns.
Finally, the ban does serve the purpose of retracting government
participation, apart from funding, in the performance of abortions.
Opponents of legal abortion may abhor the thought of government
employees performing abortions in government facilities, even when
those employees participate voluntarily and the government pays
nothing. The purpose of forbidding government involvement in the
performance of abortions is closely analogous to the permissible purpose of restricting government funding of abortions.
However, the Supreme Court has distinguished between the denial of government funding of abortions, which is seen as the refusal to
act affirmatively, and its imposition of obstacles to abortion.' 25 Moreover, where women are, in a sense, held captive by the government,
the refusal to act affirmatively and the imposition of insuperable obstacles to an abortion may be one and the same.
The case of prison abortions makes this more concrete. In the
prison setting, female inmates are captive, closely controlled by the
123 See Harris v McRae, 448 US 297, 326-37 (1980) (upholding the Hyde Amendment's
prohibition on the use of Medicaid funds for abortions except when the mother is the victim of
rape or incest or her life is endangered); Maher v Roe, 432 US 464, 473-74 (1977) (upholding a
regulation limiting state Medicaid benefits to those abortions that are medically necessary).
124 See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, 148 Cong Rec at S 5827
(cited in note 4) (statement of Senator Murray) ("Opponents have argued that there is no way
to determine the costs of these services, despite the fact that private hospitals must determine
per-unit costs of per-procedure costs, every single day.").
125 See Maher, 432 US at 474 ("The Connecticut regulation places no obstacles-absolute
or otherwise-in the pregnant woman's path to an abortion .... The State may have made childbirth a more attractive alternative, thereby influencing the woman's decision, but it has imposed
no restriction on access to abortions that was not already there.").
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state. The state, of course, has a legitimate interest in promoting fetal
life. However, if the state does not act affirmatively to provide female
prisoners access to abortions, they will have no choice but to carry
their fetuses to term. Because state inaction eviscerates the right,
some courts have held that prisons have a constitutional obligation to
facilitate prisoner access to abortions.26
In the peculiar context of foreign military bases, the government's
refusal to allow on-base abortions will be functionally equivalent, in
many cases, to a denial of the right altogether. In this setting, the purpose of refraining from involvement is the same as the forbidden purpose of restricting abortions; thus, both purposes, in this particular
case, are illegitimate. ' The military's quasi-custodial role with respect
to military personnel and dependents, like that of the prison context,
gives rise to an affirmative duty to provide access to abortions, even
though the government has no such duty with respect to the general
public.
b) Military justifications. As I argue in Part III.B, the military
abortion ban requires military justifications. Only military necessity
could justify the burdens upon a woman under the higher undue burden standard, and likewise, only military necessity can justify ratcheting down the level of scrutiny from undue burden to rational basis review. Thus, it is necessary to review military reasons for the ban. I argue that no military priorities justify the ban. The fact that military efficiency is actually better served by allowing on-base abortions rebuts
the suggestion that the ban is anything but a political attempt to curtail abortion access.
The most oft-repeated military justification for the ban is that
performing abortions on military bases hurts military morale. Abortion is a divisive issue, the argument goes, and the awareness of the
performance of the procedure in close proximity will make members
of the military less capable of discharging their duties. Raising morale
is a legitimate military goal. However, each side of the congressional
debate has argued that its side better serves morale. If Congress could
126 See Monmouth County CorrectionalInstitutionalInmates v Lanzaro, 834 F2d 326, 334,
337-38 (3d Cir 1987) (holding unconstitutional a requirement that prisoners obtain court orders
for release upon their own recognizance in order to obtain abortions; such a requirement would
completely deprive maximum security inmates of their right to an abortion, and would cause
other inmates to endure unconstitutional delay); Roe v Leis, 2001 US Dist LEXIS 4348, *9 (SD
Ohio) (following Monmouth County).
127 Again, the purpose of this Comment is to discuss the constitutional issues raised by the
ban, not to determine the exact circumstances under which it could be made constitutional.
However, it would seem that the closest case would be presented by a policy that flies a servicewoman home and back immediately. Although this might reduce the burdens associated with
health and safety risks of getting an abortion in a foreign country, the high costs of employing
such a policy only support the notion that the ban's sole purpose is the illegitimate one of restricting access to abortion.
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simply appeal to an undefined concept of "morale," it could enact virtually any regulation upon the military; such assertions must be supported by some type of evidence. Only the barest anecdotal evidence
has been offered to support either side of the congressional debate
about morale: supporters of the ban have stated that doctors oppose
performing abortions, which affects their morale;" opponents of the
ban have cited a doctor's letter and a servicewoman's letter indicating
a loss of morale from an inability to obtain abortions.'29
Other possible military justifications are equally unfounded. As
explained earlier, the argument for respect for host country laws and
customs can be blunted by the fact that the Clinton policy provided
transportation to a facility in a country where abortion was legal. The
goal of decreasing sexual tension was upheld as a legitimate rationale
for the ban on gays in the military, but the link between abortion and
sexual tension is too attenuated for that rationale to have traction in
this debate. Abortion is no more likely to promote sexual activity than
birth control or the presence of women in the military.
Moreover, assertions that the ban serves military interests can be
rebutted by showing that military goals of readiness and efficiency are
actually better served by providing access to abortion. The ban on
abortion costs more lost days from work and creates a higher risk of
serious injury to women if they must seek abortions off base. Further,
children cost the military a great deal in terms of the loss in productivity of parents and the costs of dependent benefits. Of course, this argument should not be misread to suggest that, on military bases, abortion is preferable to childbirth; it simply illustrates that efficiency justifications are inadequate to support the ban.

Some members of Congress have referenced conversations with military doctors who
oppose performing abortions on bases. See, for example, National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2000, HR 1401, 106th Cong, 1st Sess (Apr 14, 1999), in 145 Cong Rec H 3964, 3994
(June 9, 1999) (statement of Representative Weldon) ("Everybody that I spoke to, the doctors
and nurses, were very pleased that they were going to take that very, very controversial issue and
move it out of the military hospitals."). But allowing on-base abortions does not mean that military doctors would be forced to perform them; the Clinton policy explicitly provided that doctors
could opt out on the basis of conscience or moral principle. See text accompanying notes 18-19.
129 See Technical Corrections and Corrections to Enrollment of Certain Appropriations
Acts, 137 Cong Rec at S 17590 (cited in note 119) (statement of Senator Lautenberg) (introducing a letter from Dr. Jeffrey T. Jensen that noted: "The preparedness of the military would be improved not only by reducing lost work days, but also by enhancing morale through this expression of empathy for women's issues") (emphasis added); National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2004, HR 1588, 108th Cong, 1st Sess (Apr 3, 2003), in 149 Cong Rec H 4402, 4500
(May 21,2003) (statement of Representative Davis):
128

One woman wrote to me the following after being turned away at her base: "The military
expects nothing less than the best from its soldiers, and I expect the best medical care in return. If this is how I will continue to be treated as a military servicemember by my country
and its leaders, however, I want no part of it."
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First, some pregnant women will choose to have an abortion no
matter what the circumstances. That means that where a safe, legal
abortion is inaccessible, some servicewomen or military dependents
will choose to procure unsafe or illegal abortions in the host country.
Such abortions could result in injury or death to the mother.'30 In addition to the cost that such effects will have on morale and readiness, the
military will have to absorb the medical costs of treating such injuries.
The alternative to abortion is childbirth. In most cases, women
who carry their fetuses to term will keep their babies rather than give
them up for adoption. The cost to the military of an abortion is zero,
since the woman is obligated to finance it herself. Childbirth, on the
other hand, incurs not only medical costs, but also maternity leave and
more sick days. 13' In some cases, pregnancy may call vital personnel
away from their duties at times of crisis.132
Also, attrition rates will likely be very high for new mothers in
the military relative to their nonpregnant peers. Considering that
many working women who become mothers get pregnant relatively
early in the span of working years, the military will get a much lower
return on investment in terms of the resources spent training young
military women. Considering that the military work and the military
lifestyle are generally more demanding than other occupations, attrition is likely to be significantly higher among new mothers employed
by the military than among the larger working pool of new mothers.
Those who remain in the military while raising children will require
more leave than women without children. This extra leave will naturally also hold true for servicemen who father children.
In addition, the military assumes a higher degree of responsibility
for youth raised on military bases than other employers. For example,
federal law authorizes the Secretary of Defense to subsidize child care
for servicepersons on active duty,'33 and requires every military installation to have a "youth sponsorship program to facilitate the integration of dependent children ...into new surroundings" when a parent

130 The World Health Organization estimates that twenty million unsafe abortions occur
each year, resulting in about eighty thousand maternal deaths and hundreds of thousands of
disabilities The vast majority of these injuries occur in developing countries. See World Health
Organization, Address Unsafe Abortion, online at http://www.who.int/archives/whday/en/
pagesl998/whd98_10.html (visited July 1, 2004).
131 See John Luddy, Meet the US Government's Biggest Family Welfare Program,
American Enterprise (May/June 1996), online at http://www.taemag.com/issues/articlelD.16358/
article-detail.asp (visited July 1, 2004) (noting that $25 billion in defense funds go to family support costs, and that 62 percent of the military's medical funds are consumed by dependents).
132 See generally Major Merideth A. Bucher, The Impact of Pregnancy on US. Army Readiness (April 1999), online at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/acsc/99-016.pdf (visited July 23,

2004).
133

10

USc § 1788(a) (2000).
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has relocated.4 Of course, the military cannot ignore the costs of
childbirth to military readiness, for, in the not-so-distant past, it actually promoted policies of mandatory discharge of pregnant women in
acknowledgement of these very costs. 35 Further, before the strong
anti-abortion movement of the 1980s, the military permitted abortions
on bases; it should be significant that, before politicians got involved,
the military itself allowed them.
In sum, it is uncontroversial that military readiness and efficiency
are better served when military personnel are available, healthy, and
physically capable of doing their jobs. Moreover, it follows that servicewomen are better able to serve on active military duty when they
are not pregnant. Therefore, if a servicewoman or a dependent wants
to procure an abortion, it would seem to be in the military's interest to
facilitate that choice by providing the speediest access to the safest
possible abortion.
B.

Choosing and Applying a Standard

Having discussed the military and ordinary governmental justifications for the military abortion ban and the burdens that it places on
a woman's right to access an abortion, it remains only to discuss what
standard a court would apply in a challenge to the ban, and what the
outcome of such a challenge would be. First, because a clearly established framework exists for reviewing the constitutionality of restraints on abortion, and because the military context of this ban provides little in the way of reasons to vary from this framework, I argue
that the undue burden standard provides the proper standard of review. Second, the ban is unduly burdensome. Finally, I go one step further to argue that, even if a court (incorrectly) reviewed the ban under
a rational basis standard, it should still be held unconstitutional.
134 10 USC § 1785(a) (2000). For a criticism of the rate of defense spending devoted to family support programs, see Luddy, Government's Biggest Welfare Program,American Enterprise
(cited in note 131) (arguing that the military's coverage of dependents of unwed servicewomen
means that "[tihere is now no better place in America to be an unwed mother than in the armed
forces"). Luddy further argues:

Consider an unmarried female Petty Officer Third Class. If she becomes pregnant, she may
immediately request special permission to move out of barracks or off ship and live off base
at government expense. After her twentieth week of pregnancy, commanders are required
to grant such a request. Nine months' housing allowance amounts to approximately $2,400.
After the woman's child is born, she receives 45 days of paid maternity leave, worth an additional $1,800. Throughout her pregnancy, our sailor is entitled to free obstetrical care, and
free delivery. Her infant immediately becomes eligible for years of day care, medical and
dental care, recreational and educational subsidies, and other benefits. Financial costs in just
this first year run to many thousands of dollars.
Id.
135 See Crawfordv Cushman,531 F2d 1114, 1124-26 (2d Cir 1976) (holding unconstitutional
the military's practice of discharging pregnant women).
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1. The undue burden framework provides the correct standard
of review.
The military cases show that there is no clear doctrinal dividing
line between when to apply a higher standard of review and when to
apply a deferential rational basis review. The choice of a standard of
review depends on a consideration of the competing military interests
and constitutional claims.' 6 Courts are left to determine on a case-bycase basis whether the articulated military justifications for a particular decision are weighty enough to defer to the military's judgment.
The case law indicates that, where a higher standard of review normally applies, and where the facts of the case do not implicate the
policies behind deferring to the military, the higher standard will be
applied."' This is a sensible approach, because the purpose of deferen-

tial review in the military context is to allow leaders significant authority and flexibility to deal with issues of national security and mili-

tary readiness;'m where such issues are not really at stake, individual
rights should receive greater protection.
A challenge to the military abortion ban could be distinguished

from military cases where courts exercised judicial restraint because it
is basically unrelated to issues of military efficiency and national security."' 9 Given the widespread federal activity to halt even the most indi-

rect government participation in abortion, such as in the contexts of
domestic and international public health funding and Medicaid, a re-

viewing court should consider the risk that military justifications are
pretextual. If we assume that military justifications are pretextual, this
136

In practice, courts weigh private interests, as well as the potential for improper or politi-

cally based motives, against possible military justifications. This balancing affects both the selection of a standard and the outcome on the merits. This argument echoes criticisms as to the artificiality of the Court's multitiered analytical framework in the equal protection context. See
Craigv Boren, 429 US 190, 212 (1976) (Stevens concurring):
I am inclined to believe that what has become known as the [ ]tiered analysis of equal protection claims does not describe a completely logical method of deciding cases, but rather is
a method the Court has employed to explain decisions that actually apply a single standard
in a reasonably consistent fashion.
See also note 80.
137 See Frontiero,411 US at 690-91 (plurality) (holding that the statutory difference in the
treatment of male and female military personnel for the purpose of determining "dependent"
benefits violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Berkley, 287 F3d at
1091 (reversing the trial court on the grounds that strict scrutiny, not rational basis, was the appropriate standard to be applied to an Air Force policy that treated women and minority officers
differently from other officers with regard to involuntary termination) O'Neill, 364 F Supp at
579 (applying strict scrutiny to the prohibition on marriage at the Merchant Marine Academy).
138 Although deference to the military can also be justified on the same grounds as deference to any agency (expertise, institutional competency, democratic legitimacy, etc.), see text accompanying notes 50-51, such "civil" deference does not permit agencies to trump individual
constitutional rights; only the special purpose of national security allows that.
139 See Part III.A.2(b).
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still does not answer the question of how the civil justifications stack
up against the ban's burdens, but it does answer the question of which
standard to use. The only reason to vary from the undue burden standard is the military context at issue here. Moreover, even when rational military interests are at stake, a right may be so much more important by comparison that it must be reviewed under its accompanying constitutional standard.'

If a court were concerned that the higher standard of review does
not give enough deference and flexibility to the military to make appropriate policies, it should consider that deference can be built into

either the choice of a standard or the application of the standard.''
The undue burden standard explicitly allows for a weighing of state
and private interests; whether a burden is undue depends on the coun-

tervailing government justifications. Although the purpose of burdening abortion access, when it exists in isolation from other legitimate
purposes, creates burdens that are per se undue, an important and le-

gitimate military justification could mean that a restriction's burdens
are not at all undue. Thus, the higher standard adequately accounts for
legitimate military interests.
2. The burdens imposed by the military abortion ban are

per se undue.
Again, the military abortion ban cannot be justified on the basis
of military justifications; the fact that the goals of military efficiency
and readiness are actually better served by allowing on-base access to

abortion rebuts the premise that the ban serves genuine military justifications.14After possible military justifications for the ban are stripped
away, only civil justifications remain.
140 See, for example, O'Neill, 364 F Supp at 579 (striking down the Merchant Marine Academy's prohibition on marriage for all cadets). It is worth considering whether courts are informally engaging in an "imminence" or "absoluteness" inquiry in an examination of how fundamental rights are either granted or denied in the military context. Some rights can be curtailed
for military reasons without a wholesale deprivation. For example, although Goldman upheld the
Air Force's prohibition on wearing headgear (including yarmulkes) indoors, the decision did not
require the wholesale prohibition of an Orthodox Jew's religious exercise. See generally 475 US
503. In contrast, some rights are either upheld or denied completely, such as restraints on marriage. The right to an abortion on a military base falls into the latter category; for many servicewomen and dependents, regardless of accommodative military policies, delay or expense may
mean that a woman who is denied the right to an abortion on a base will be incapable of exercising the right at all.
141 See Berkley, 287 F3d at 1091 ("[W]e do not reach the question of what effect, if any, deference to the military would have on the judicial application of strict scrutiny.").
142 See Part III.A.2(b). Regarding the analytically parallel setting of prisons, see also Monmouth County, 834 F2d at 341-42 & n 22 (holding that the restriction on women inmates' ability
to access abortion was not related to the legitimate penological interest of conserving the
prison's limited resources where "the presence of pregnant inmates in the prison population ...
places a greater burden on jail resources and administrative concerns than would a woman who
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Although a state's legitimate interest in fetal life makes legitimate the purpose of discouraging abortion, it is illegitimate to do so
by making an abortion exceedingly difficult to obtain. The purpose of
discouraging abortion can only be upheld via provisions that "inform
the woman's free choice, not hinder it.' ' .3 The case law indicates that
the ban is more like those provisions that have been struck down as
hindering choice than those upheld as informing choice. For example,
spousal notification provisions have been struck down as a substantial
obstacle likely to deter some women from procuring abortions.' Although the military ban does not formally require notification, it may
result in a de facto employer notification requirement.'45 While other
employment settings permit a woman to take vacation time without
informing her boss of her intentions, the military is different. Conversely, twenty-four-hour waiting periods have been upheld,'" but
these serve the government goal of providing pregnant women with
the opportunity to weigh costs and risks associated with both abortion
and childbirth; delays in the context of the military ban (which are
likely to extend much longer than twenty-four hours) are not motivated by similar intentions.
The case most on point here is Roe itself. Roe involved a Texas
law proscribing abortion in all cases except when the life of the
mother was endangered.' 7 Unlike subsequent laws that involved administrative or informational regulations,"8 or the refusal of federal or
ends her pregnancy prior to full term").
143 Casey, 505 US at 877 (plurality) (noting that regulations that "express a profound respect for the life of the unborn are permitted, if they are not a substantial obstacle to the
woman's exercise of the right to choose").
144 See id at 893-94 (majority). It is relevant to note that the spousal notification provision
struck down in Casey merely required a woman to sign a statement that she had notified her
spouse of her decision to procure an abortion; a statement from her husband affirming notification was not required. Further, the notification requirement could be waived under a number of
circumstances, including affirmation by the woman that her spouse was not the person who impregnated her, or that physical abuse would result from notification. See id at 887.
145 It may be the case that an on-base abortion also provides de facto employer notification,
depending on medical circumstances and the type of job performed. Compare Planned Parenthood's website at http://www.plannedparenthood.org/abortion/what-to-expect.htm (visited July
1, 2004) ("After an abortion up to the 25th week, you will rest in a medically supervised recovery
room for as long as necessary, usually about an hour.... Usually you can return to work or your
normal activities the day after early abortion-depending on how strenuous your normal activities are."), with the Boulder Valley Women's Health Center's website at http://www.bvwhc.org/
abortion.htmi (visited May 14, 2004) ("You should plan on three weeks of healing. During this
time, you need to get plenty of rest, eat nutritious foods and avoid strenuous activity.").
146 See, for example, Casey, 505 US at 881-87 (plurality) (upholding a twenty-four-hour
waiting period between the provision of information about the procedure and the actual performance of the procedure). Casey reversed City of Akron v Akron Center for Reproductive
Health,462 US 416,449-51 (1983), which had held a similar provision unconstitutional.
147 See Roe, 410 US at 117-18 (noting that a majority of the states had statutes similar to
the Texas statute).
148 See note 146.
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state government to affirmatively guarantee access to abortions,' 9 the
Texas statute in Roe was a statewide ban. A military base can be
analogized to a state; although there would be no constitutional problem if no abortion providers chose to operate within a certain state, it
is obviously impermissible for a government to outlaw the practice entirely. To outlaw abortion in the federal "jurisdiction" of foreign military bases is the equivalent of a statewide abortion ban.
An awkwardness arises out of the fact that, in this case, the entire
"jurisdiction" is government-owned. If the purpose of eliminating government funding of abortions is legitimate, why is it illegitimate to
eliminate government participation altogether? The answer is that, in
certain narrow contexts, the normally legitimate purpose of disentangling government from support of abortion is equivalent to the illegitimate purpose of denying the right altogether. Though the lack of
government funding for abortions may make it practically impossible
for indigent women to access abortion, the government is not actually
forbidding abortion. Outlawing abortion on military bases is more like
outlawing abortion in an entire state (necessitating travel that may, in
fact, be more difficult than simple interstate travel), which Roe held
unlawful, than it is like funding one activity to the exclusion of another. Where women are held captive by the government, either legally (as in prisons) or practically (as on foreign military bases), the
government does have an affirmative obligation to provide access to
safe and legal abortions without undue delay.""
3. The military abortion ban cannot withstand rational basis
review.
Some skeptics might doubt whether a court would really select
the undue burden standard, given the judiciary's historical hands-off
approach to reviewing military infringements of constitutional rights.
Having outlined the reasons that a court should review the ban under
the undue burden standard, and why the ban fails that higher standard, I also maintain that the ban could not withstand even rational
basis scrutiny.
Though the rational basis standard is designed with built-in deference to a government entity's authority to choose among rational
policy alternatives, the actual exercise of that standard varies dramatically depending on the means and ends at issue."' This variation is as
149 See note 123.

150 See notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
151 See United States Railroad Retirement Board v Fritz, 449 US 166,176-77 n 10 (1980) (citing eleven of the Court's rational basis holdings, stating that "[tihe most arrogant legal scholar
would not claim that all of these cases applied a uniform or consistent test under equal protection principles").
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true in the context of military regulations as in any other context.
When military regulations have little to do with the military context,
and simply relate to the government's role of employer more generally, rational basis review will be less deferential. Examples include the
ban on pregnant women in the military that was struck down in Crawford v Cushman," ' and the denial of coverage for the abortion of an
anencephalic fetus that was reversed in Britell.'3 Crawford noted that
the plaintiff's claims "must be evaluated in relation to the specific
military justifications alleged here-the demands of readiness, mobility and administrative convenience -without unjustified presumptions
of validity for either competing interest given in our inquiry on the
merits ......
The only reason for switching to the lower standard of rational
basis review is concern for broad legitimate military purposes. Thus,
for rational basis review to apply, the military abortion ban must have
rational military justifications. However, the ban has no rational relationship to furthering the legitimate goals of raising morale or reducing sexual tension.' Assuming that a reviewing court begins its analysis "without unjustified presumptions of validity for either competing
interest, ,,116 any assertion that military goals are served by the ban
would have to be supported by evidence.' 7 Moreover, even though the
ban must have legitimate military justifications, the ban is not even
justified by legitimate civil purposes. That is, because the ban lacks any
rationale but to burden access to abortion, it lacks a rational relationship to a legitimate government interest. Thus, the same illegitimate
purpose that makes the ban per se undue also makes it irrational.
CONCLUSION

The military abortion ban restricts the abortion rights of servicewomen in ways that no other American woman's rights could be restricted. Considering the financial and efficiency costs to the military
152 531 F2d 1114 (2d Cir 1976). The court pointed out that "considerations of judicial restraint are relevant to the decision to review, but once review commences the 'intrusion' into
military concerns has in a sense already occurred." Id at 1121.
153 204 F Supp 2d at 194-95 (noting that it made little rational sense to deny funding for the
abortion of anencephalic fetuses).
154 531 F2d at 1121 (noting that deference to the military did not stop judicial review in the
case).
155 See Part III.A.2(b).
156 Crawford,531 F2d at 1121.
157 For example, though many have argued that the ban on gays in the military is founded
on irrational prejudice rather than rational attempts to promote privacy and reduce sexual tension, Congress has at least adduced substantial evidence to support the policy's rationality. See
Able v United States, 155 F3d 628, 632 (2d Cir 1998) (noting that deference to the military was
especially appropriate "where, as here, the challenged restriction was the result of exhaustive inquiry by Congress in hearings, committee and floor debate").
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of childbirth and child-rearing, and the lack of support for a legitimate
morale argument, it does not follow that Congress has banned abortions on bases for military reasons. A legal realist analysis of existing
case law suggests that, regardless of whether a court applied the undue burden standard or a rational basis standard, the ban would be
found unconstitutional.
I concede that a challenge to the ban is unlikely, given the costs
and reputational risks of bringing such a challenge. I also readily admit that any number of circumstances on the ground might make an
abortion on a foreign military base impractical or infeasible. Under
such circumstances, placing a heavier burden on a woman's access to
abortion is neither undue nor irrational. However, a military-wide ban
suggests an indifference to military circumstances that underscores
the legislative history indicating that the ban is politically, not militarily, motivated. At a time when the need for military efficiency is high,
and when greater numbers of women serve in the armed forces than
ever before, the military's focus should be on guaranteeing the best
access to medical care possible -including access to abortions.

